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ENHANCED CITIZENSHIP VERIFICATION AND CHILDREN’S MEDICAID
COVERAGE
∗

JAMES MARTON, ANGELA SNYDER and MEI ZHOU

This article examines a potential unintended consequence of the mandated Medicaid
citizenship verification requirements of the 2005 Deficit Reduction Act (DRA). We
investigate whether or not these new rules led to an increase in the Medicaid exit rate
among enrollees using state administrative data from Georgia. We do this by comparing
the exit rate for children enrolled in Medicaid whose first coverage recertification
occurs just after implementation of the DRA (which we refer to as a “high impact”
first recertification) with those whose first recertification occurs just prior (which we
refer to as a “low impact” first recertification). Our analysis suggests that children in
the high-impact first recertification group were about 2 percentage points more likely
to exit Medicaid than those in the low-impact group. Furthermore, these additional
exits occurred in racial and ethnic groups more likely to be citizens than noncitizens
and prereform estimates suggest that there were very few (roughly 0.10%) noncitizen
Medicaid enrollees to begin with. Taken together, our results suggest that the DRAenhanced citizenship verification rules led to an increase in Medicaid disenrollment,
and thus a reduction in coverage, among citizens. (JEL I18, I38, J13)
I.

and whether or not requiring such proof imposes
a significant barrier to participation for those eligible. Given this backdrop, a relatively recent
federal rule change regarding citizenship verification requirements in state Medicaid programs
has received considerable attention in the popular press.1 Beginning in July 2006, the Deficit
Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA) required most new

INTRODUCTION

A persistent issue associated with the design
of transfer programs in the United States is
whether noncitizens are eligible to participate in
such programs. Requiring citizenship for program participation introduces the questions of
what constitutes sufficient proof of citizenship
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1. See for example the following article in the New York
Times:
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/05/washington/
05medicaid.html?_r=0

ABBREVIATIONS
ACA: Affordable Care Act
AFDC: Aid to Families with Dependent Children
CHIPRA:
Children’s Health Insurance Program
Reauthorization Act
CMS: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
CPS: Current Population Survey
DCH: Department of Community Health
DRA: Deficit Reduction Act
GAO: Government Accountability Office
LIM: Low Income Medicaid
OIG: Office of Inspector General
RSM: Right from the Start Medicaid
SSI: Supplemental Security Income
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Medicaid applicants, as well as most current beneficiaries (at their next recertification of eligibility), to document their citizenship. Acceptable
documentation includes a U.S. passport, birth
certificate, or driver’s license from a state that
verifies social security numbers.2 The purpose of
this article is to investigate the possibility that this
rule change led to the unintended consequence
of increasing the rate at which citizens exited the
Medicaid program using state administrative data
on children from Georgia.
Previous research (Bansak and Raphael 2007
and Wolfe and Scrivner 2005) suggests that, in
general, increases in the complexity of application and renewal requirements within public
insurance programs will lead to reductions in
take-up rates and increases in disenrollment rates
among those eligible. Thus, if a programmatic
priority going forward is to increase the coverage
rate of uninsured Medicaid-eligible children, it
will be important to have a better understanding
of how increases in the requirements to document
citizenship impact participation. This topic takes
on added significance because of the Affordable
Care Act (ACA), as states must verify the citizenship status of individuals obtaining subsidies
for coverage through state health insurance
exchanges and noncitizens remain ineligible for
expanded Medicaid coverage.
One previous study, Sommers (2010), examines the extent to which this rule change increased
the ability of Medicaid administrators to ensure
that benefits were not going to ineligible noncitizens using data from the Current Population
Survey (CPS). The study compares changes in
states that already utilized enhanced citizenship
verification prior to the reform to changes in those
that did not. The results suggest that the DRA
reduced Medicaid enrollment among noncitizens,
as intended. Because we focus on the potential
for an adverse effect on citizens, we view our
work as a complement to Sommers (2010).
Medicaid microenrollment data from 2004 to
2008 provided to us by the Georgia Department
2. According to the CMS website, prior to July 2006,
individuals were not eligible for Medicaid unless they were
either American citizens or qualified aliens; however, beneficiaries could self-declare their citizenship status by checking a box on the application form under penalty of perjury. The DRA required, starting in July 2006, actual documentary evidence of a person’s status when applying for
Medicaid coverage or, if already enrolled, when recertifying
coverage. This must be enforced by states in order to receive
their federal Medicaid match. For more on what is considered documentary evidence, see the following link from
the CMS website: http://www.cms.gov/Regulations-andGuidance/Legislation/DeficitReductionAct/Citizenship.html
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of Community Health (DCH) allow us to examine the extent to which the DRA increased the exit
rate of enrollees from the program. We compare
the exit rate for children enrolled in Medicaid
whose first coverage recertification occurs postDRA implementation in the summer and fall of
2005 (which we refer to as a “high impact” first
recertification) with those whose first recertification occurs pre-DRA implementation in the winter and spring of 2005 (which we refer to as a “low
impact” first recertification). If the DRA caused
a greater number of enrollees to lose their coverage, we would expect a higher exit rate for those
having a high-impact first recertification as compared to those having a low-impact first recertification, because the main difference between the
two groups is shown to be whether or not they
were required to produce their original birth certificate in order to recertify their coverage.
Our analysis suggests that children in the
high-impact group were about 2 percentage
points more likely to exit Medicaid than those
in the low-impact group. Such a large difference
is not observed if we compare Medicaid children whose first recertification occurred in the
summer or fall of 2004 with those whose first
recertification occurred in the winter or spring of
2004. This gives us confidence that our results
are not simply reflecting seasonal differences
in exit rates. In addition, we do not observe an
impact of the DRA among children enrolled in
Medicaid via the Supplemental Security Income
(SSI) program, as those children were already
subject to enhanced citizenship verification.
Furthermore, these additional exits occurred
in racial and ethnic groups more likely to be
citizens than noncitizens, and prereform estimates suggest that there were very few (roughly
0.10%) noncitizen Medicaid enrollees to begin
with (U.S. Government Accountability Office
2007). Taken together, our results suggest that
the DRA-enhanced citizenship verification rules
led to an increase in Medicaid disenrollment, and
thus a reduction in coverage, among citizens.
II.

LITERATURE REVIEW

States face competing priorities when implementing public health insurance programs. One
such challenge is balancing the accuracy of eligibility determination with the ease of Medicaid
enrollment and retention for eligible individuals.3
3. See Klevin and Kopczuk (2011) for a recent theoretical
analysis of this issue.
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This is especially true given DRA-enhanced citizenship verification requirements and the
incentives given to states for administrative
simplification and increased enrollment under
the Children’s Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act (CHIPRA) of 2009. In addition,
under the ACA, states must balance the eligibility
policies and system linkages required between
the health insurance exchanges and Medicaid
with the shrinking pool of federal uncompensated care dollars in order to minimize use of
state funds and assure individuals are enrolled in
the appropriate programs.
Prior to DRA enactment, the Office of the
Inspector General recognized this challenge and
reported on citizenship self-declaration policies
within Medicaid (U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services 2005). In a descriptive study of
state Medicaid directors, the Office of Inspector
General (OIG) found that most states allowing
self-declaration of citizenship reported they had
not seen a problem with noncitizens gaining
Medicaid coverage as evidenced by their post
eligibility quality control activities. Only one
state, Oregon, quantified the problem, estimating that about 1% of their mailed-in Medicaid
applications (U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services 2005) had citizenship-related
problems. Medicaid directors also indicated that
if all Medicaid applicants were required to provide documentary evidence of U.S. citizenship,
then this would delay eligibility determinations,
increase eligibility personnel costs, as well as be
burdensome for applicants and current enrollees
(U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
2005).
The peer-reviewed literature supports the
notion that decreasing the administrative burden
for applicants leads to increases in take-up and
retention of public coverage. Studies of state policies suggest that eliminating asset tests, allowing
for presumptive eligibility, offering continuous
coverage, simplifying applications, reducing
waiting periods, and increasing outreach activities all have a positive impact on take-up and
retention (Bansak and Raphael 2007; Bronchetti
2014; Wolfe and Scrivner 2005). Furthermore,
transitions between Medicaid and separate CHIP
programs (Ketsche et al. 2007a, 2007b), changes
from passive to an active renewal process (Herndon et al. 2008), welfare reform (Watson 2014),
managed care implementation (Marton and
Yelowitz 2015; Marton, Yelowitz, and Talbert
2014), as well as premium increases (Dague
2014; Kenney et al. 2006; Kenney et al. 2007,

Marton 2007, Marton, Ketsche, and Zhou, 2010;
Marton and Talbert 2010; Marton et al. 2015)
lead to increases in disenrollment and increased
gaps in coverage, otherwise known as churning.
Thus, this prior research suggests that the
implementation of increased citizenship documentation requirements should negatively
impact both take-up and retention of citizens.
This is consistent with the self-reported survey
research done by the Government Accounting
Office of 44 states post-DRA implementation
(U.S. Government Accountability Office 2007).
The Government Accountability Office (GAO)
reported that citizenship documentation requirements resulted in enrollment declines for eligible
citizens and posed administration burdens on
states. Of those surveyed, 22 of the 44 states
reported a decline in enrollment, 12 reported no
change, and 10 stated that they did not know the
effect of the requirement. In its response to the
GAO, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS) questioned the validity of the
results saying they were all based on anecdotal
statements without supporting data analysis to
attribute all declines to the new requirements.4
A Commonwealth Fund Report identified
enrollment declines by a closer examination
of data from seven states during the 6 months
that followed implementation of the enhanced
citizenship verification rules compared to the 6
months that preceded the change (Summer 2009).
This study found that the new citizenship documentation requirements made the enrollment and
renewal process more complex, administratively
burdensome, and costly. Summer (2009) also
found the impact on applicants and beneficiaries
differed by state depending, in part, on the state’s
infrastructure and approach to implementation.
Several states reported that while the policy is
aimed at undocumented immigrants, predominantly Hispanics in the United States, it was
more likely to negatively impact other population groups who are citizens and are eligible for
and/or participating in public programs (Ross
2007; Summer 2009). Angus and DeVoe (2010)
looked specifically at Oregon’s Family Planning Program implemented through a Medicaid
waiver. They found an association between
enhanced Medicaid citizenship documentation
4. The CMS is part of the U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS) and is responsible for administering Medicare, Medicaid, the Children’s Health Insurance
Program (CHIP), and parts of the Affordable Care Act (ACA).
For further information, please see the CMS website: https://
www.cms.gov/
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FIGURE 1
Different Types of First Recertifications
Child 1

Child 2

Child 3

Child 1
Recert 1

Child 2
Recert 1

DRA
Implementation

requirements and reductions in access to family
planning for young adults as well as an increasing
strain on the social safety net.
Sommers (2010) uses the CPS to estimate
a difference-in-differences model to compare
states classified by the author as not having
major changes in Medicaid citizenship verification policy with all other states before and after
the implementation of the DRA. The primary
outcome of interest is the Medicaid coverage
status of noncitizens and he finds that one in
four adult noncitizens in Medicaid and one in
eight child noncitizens were screened out by the
DRA annually.
To summarize, these previous studies and
reports suggest that there were likely not a large
number of noncitizens obtaining Medicaid coverage prior to the DRA. For its own DRA cost
analysis, CMS itself assumed that in fiscal year
2008 50,000 noncitizen beneficiaries would be
determined to be ineligible as a result of the
DRA (U.S. Government Accountability Office
2007). This represents roughly 0.10% of the average Medicaid enrollment of 49.1 million people
around this time (Truffer et al. 2008). While Sommers (2010) shows that the DRA was successful
in reducing the small number of noncitizens
participating in Medicaid, left unanswered is an
empirical estimate of the associated cost in terms
of disruptions in the Medicaid coverage of citizens. Many of these studies and reports suggest
anecdotally that this cost may not be trivial.
III.

IDENTIFICATION STRATEGY

Our basic identification strategy is to restrict
attention to children that initiated Medicaid

Child 3
Recert 1

coverage in the year prior to the reform and
compare the recertification experience of ones
that start earlier in the year to those that started
later in the year. This is because those that
started earlier in the year would not be subject to
enhanced citizenship verification upon their first
6-month eligibility recertification whereas those
that started later in the year would. We refer to
those experiencing their first recertification on
or after January 2006 as having a high-impact
first recertification (coverage spell started in the
summer or fall of 2005) and others as having a
low-impact first recertification (coverage spell
started in the winter or spring of 2005).
Figure 1 gives an illustration of two children with a low-impact first recertification and
one child with a high-impact first recertification. Child 1 and child 2 enrolled prior to the
DRA and also had their first recertification prior
to the reform. Child 3 also enrolled prior to
the DRA, but faces the stricter requirements at
their first recertification. If there is an impact of
this rule change on enrolled children, such highimpact first recertifications would be the most
likely place for it to appear. In order to assess
the magnitude of this effect, we can compare the
exit rate during these high-impact first recertifications with the low-impact first recertifications
that occurred in months just before the reform.
Because all of these children started their spell in
the year prior to the reform in the same eligibility
category, they are arguably otherwise similar.
In order to test our identification strategy, we
perform two placebo tests. First, we perform the
same analysis on children whose coverage spells
start in 2004. The DRA could not have caused
children starting their Medicaid coverage in the
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FIGURE 2
Monthly Enrollment of Children in Georgia Medicaid (July 2003–June 2008)

summer or fall of 2004 (the placebo high-impact
group) to exit coverage at a higher rate than
those that started in the winter or spring of 2004
(the placebo low-impact group). This placebo test
allows us to determine the extent to which any
differences in the exit rates we observe among our
2005 Medicaid coverage spells is being driven by
seasonality, rather than the DRA. As a second
placebo test, we perform the same analysis on
children jointly enrolled in Georgia Medicaid and
the federal SSI program during 2005. Because
these children are enrolled in the SSI program,
they were already subject to enhanced citizenship
verification. Thus, we should not expect to see
any impact of the DRA on these children and they
will not be included in our main 2005 analysis
sample described in detail below.
IV.

DATA

In order to implement the identification
strategy described in the last section, we would
need data on Medicaid enrollment spells that are
not typically publically available, including the
start month of an enrollee’s spell of Medicaid
coverage, the end month for that spell, as well as
the eligibility category associated with the spell.

The Georgia DCH provided us with the universe
of confidential Georgia Medicaid administrative
enrollment records for each month between July
2003 and June 2008 because they were interested
in the impact the DRA-enhanced citizenship verification requirements were having in their state.
To give a sense of the scope of Medicaid coverage for children in Georgia, Figure 2 graphs the
total monthly enrollment of children in Georgia
Medicaid during this time. Georgia implemented
the enhanced Medicaid citizenship verification
rules prescribed by the DRA in January 2006.
The number of children in Medicaid rises above
900,000 per month in the months just prior to the
policy change and then falls to about 750,000 in
June 2008. This graph does not account for contemporaneous confounders, such as changes in
economic conditions. In addition, an aggregate
enrollment count such as this may hide different
patterns for different types of children.
In order to identify the impact of the DRA,
we restrict attention to children enrolled through
the eligibility category for which the reform
was most likely to be binding, the “Low
Income Medicaid” or “LIM” eligibility category (which is based on the 1996 Aid to Families
with Dependent Children [AFDC] income

MARTON, SNYDER & ZHOU: MEDICAID CITIZENSHIP VERIFICATION
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TABLE 1
Descriptive Statistics for Georgia LIM Medicaid Spells (Initiated between December 2004 and
December 2005)
# spells

All Cohorts
104,081

Low Impact
40,572

High Impact
63,509

17.82%
31.36%
27.80%
23.02%
51.08%
65.30%
39.13%

18.72%
31.53%
27.21%
22.54%
51.10%
64.14%
38.10%

17.25%
31.25%
28.18%
23.33%
51.06%
66.03%
39.79%

18.46
80.50%
19.50%

19.75
82.78%
17.22%

17.63
79.05%
20.95%

Demographics
Age under 1***
Age 1–5
Age 6–12***
Age 13–18***
Female
Non-white***
Atlanta metro***
Spell characteristics
Average spell length (months)***
Spells ending in an observed exit***
Spells that are right-censored***
***Difference statistically significant at the 1% level.

standards).5 We further restrict our attention to
the 104,081 Georgia LIM Medicaid spells for
children initiated between December 2004 and
December 2005. Children initiating these spells
did not have to meet the enhanced citizenship
verification requirement in order to enroll. In
addition, children starting their spell between
December 2004 and April 2005 experienced their
first recertification prior to DRA implementation
in Georgia (i.e., the low-impact first recertification group), while children starting their
spell between May 2005 and December 2006
experienced their first recertification AFTER
DRA implementation (i.e., the high-impact first
recertification group).6
5. Most of the children in Georgia Medicaid are typically
eligible for coverage through one of three eligibility categories: Low Income Medicaid (LIM), Right from the Start
Medicaid (RSM)—Georgia’s low-income expansion population eligibility category that also covers pregnancy-related
Medicaid eligibility—and those with a disability who receive
Supplemental Security Income (SSI). We restrict our study
cohort to LIM enrollments because all LIM beneficiaries
recertifying their Medicaid coverage would be newly required
to provide proof of citizenship after the implementation of the
DRA. As mentioned, disabled children eligible for Medicaid
through their joint enrollment in the SSI program have always
been required to provide proof of citizenship due to the federal
nature of the SSI program. Because RSM includes many newborns that are born into Medicaid coverage and thus would not
need to provide proof of citizenship, they are excluded from
our analysis.
6. It should be noted here that we dropped spells starting
in September 2005 from our sample because of an administrative data issue. Both the number of new spells initiated in
that month and the subsequent number of exits generated by
those spells are roughly twice as high as in any other month
in the data we were provided. One possible explanation is that
there may have been some sort of double counting going on
in terms of spell initiation, so the increased number of exits is
one way to address that from a programmatic head counting
perspective.

Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the
LIM spells that are the focus of our analysis.
The descriptive statistics are given for all spells
as well as separated by those that faced lowversus high-impact first recertifications. Overall,
the average spell length is 18 months and 81%
of the coverage spells end before June 2008.
Spells that are ongoing or initiated in June 2008
are treated as right-censored. Spells associated
with a low-impact first recertification appear
to be slightly more likely to end in an exit as
compared to spells associated with a high-impact
first recertification. This may seem somewhat
surprising, but it is important to remember that
the reform does not impact all enrolled children
at the same time. This motivates our approach of
focusing on months in which we are most likely
to see an impact of the reform and compare them
to otherwise similar months.
Significance tests suggest that most of the
demographic differences between the two groups
are statistically significant, but we view the
absolute size of these differences to be small in
terms of economic significance. Our high-impact
group of 63,509 enrollees represents 1,119,901
enrollee-months of data and our low-impact
group of 40,572 enrollees represents 801,376
enrollee-months of data, so our total sample size
for these significance tests is 1,921,277 enrolleemonths, which suggests that we have a great deal
of precision to identify even small differences
between the two groups. Given that we are not
dealing with random assignment between the
two groups, we will control for the observable
characteristics given in Table 1 in our hazard
regression analysis.
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V. EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION

We use a hazard model approach to estimate
the impact of the reform on the duration of each
LIM child’s enrollment in Medicaid using the
104,081 spells described in Table 1. Of these
spells, 83,789 end in an exit prior to the last
month in our data, June 2008. As is common in
the literature, if the child remains enrolled in June
2008 or ages out of the program upon turning
19, we treat their spell as right-censored. State
Medicaid administrative enrollment data does not
typically identify the reason for a child’s exit
from coverage and that is also true in Georgia.7
The hazard model we estimate is specified in
Equation (1) below:
)
(
)
(
(1) H (t) = exp X1t ′β1 ∗ exp tα1 + t2 α2 .
Here, we are estimating the impact of the
observable characteristics parametrically using
the standard proportional hazards functional form
(exp(X1t ’β1 )). Included in the vector X1t are dummies for high-impact first recertification months,
low-impact first recertification months, and other
recertification months.8
We also include in this vector the demographic
controls described in Table 1 and an indicator for
any months with a higher than average unemployment rate. A key component of any analysis of
time varying covariates is the proper specification of the baseline hazard. Rather than modeling
the baseline hazard in the standard way (using the
7. This implies there is no code in the data for a termination of a child’s coverage due to the inability to produce
the child’s original birth certificate. This also implies we cannot directly differentiate between a child that loses Medicaid
coverage because of the DRA, one that drops Medicaid coverage as a result of gaining private insurance coverage, and
one that drops Medicaid coverage in Georgia after moving to
another state.
8. As described, the purpose of focusing on comparing
the first recertification between the “high” and “low” impact
groups is to make a clean comparison. Both groups start their
enrollment spells under the pre-DRA citizenship rules. The
only difference is that the high-impact group has to show
their original birth certificate upon their first recertification
while the low-impact group does not. The subsequent recertifications for the high-impact group are classified as “other”
because the child would not have them if the child’s family were not able to produce their birth certificate at their
first (high impact) recertification. The subsequent recertifications for the low-impact group are a mix of one eventual
high-impact recertification and then additional recertifications
if the child’s family was able to produce their birth certificate. We do not focus on that eventual high-impact recertification because it happens further away from the start of the
child’s spell (if the child remains enrolled long enough), as
they would have already successfully recertified their coverage at least one time before the start of the DRA citizenship
rules.

Weibull distribution), we include a quadratic in
time on the right-hand side of our model (exp(tαj1
+ t2 αj2 )) to control for any general temporal patterns in program exits. While our approach to
modeling the baseline hazard is still ultimately
a parametric one, it does provide more flexibility than the Weibull distribution, because our
approach allows for the estimation of two parameters rather than the single Weibull shape parameter.9 We will test the sensitivity of our results to
this assumption below.
VI.

RESULTS

In this section, we first present descriptive
graphical evidence regarding the impact of the
DRA on children’s disenrollment from Medicaid
in Georgia. Next, we describe the results of our
primary empirical hazard model specification and
the two placebo tests previously mentioned. We
then present the results of a simulation exercise
based on our primary results. Finally, we discuss
several additional specification checks.
A. The Impact of the DRA on Enrollment
Duration for Enrolled Children: Descriptive
Evidence
Figure 3A plots the unadjusted survival curve
for the LIM Medicaid children described in Table
1 experiencing a high-impact first recertification
(those that started coverage in the summer or fall
of 2005) in black and the survival curve for children experiencing a low-impact first recertification (those that started coverage in the winter or
spring of 2005) in gray. The x axis represents
months since the start of a spell, which is sometimes referred to as “spell time” as opposed to
“calendar time.” The y axis represents the proportion of children initially enrolled in each group
that remain enrolled. We would expect the survival curves to look similar for the “high impact”
and “low impact” groups prior to their first recertification, which occurs around month 6. At that
point, we would expect the survival curve for
those in the high-impact group to dip below the
survival curve for the low-impact group because
children in the high-impact group had to provide
their original birth certificate at their eligibility
recertification while children in the low-impact
group did not. This is indeed what we observe in
9. Marton, Ketsche, and Zhou (2010) use a similar
approach to estimate the impact of premium changes on the
duration of enrollment in public coverage.
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FIGURE 3
Exit Patterns: (A) 2005 Main LIM Sample and (B) 2004 Placebo LIM Sample

the graph, although with this graph alone, we cannot rule out that this reflects some sort of seasonal
difference in disenrollment patterns.
As an informal placebo test and check on
disenrollment patterns, Figure 3B plots the same
types of unadjusted survival curves for children

enrolled in 2004, 2 years prior to DRA implementation. The placebo high-impact group starts
their coverage in the summer or fall of 2004
and the placebo low-impact group starts their
coverage in the winter or spring of 2004. Absent
any seasonal differences, we would expect
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TABLE 2
Duration Model for Georgia LIM Medicaid Spells for Children (Initiated between December 2004
and December 2005)
Variable

Hazard

High-impact first recertification
2.62
Female
1.02
Non-white
0.93
Age under 1
0.48
Age 1–5
0.77
Age 6–12
0.78
High unemployment month
0.90
Time
1.12
Time squared
1.00
Low-impact first recertification
2.18
Other recertification
1.23
# spells
104,081
# exits
83,789
Log-likelihood
−130719.02
Average spell length
18.5
Average exit probability
4.36%
Test statistic for test of equality of high-impact and
152.06
low-impact hazards
p value
0.0000

the two survival curves to look similar since
both groups faced pre-DRA first recertification
procedures. The results are as expected. Thus,
this pair of graphs provides some suggestive
evidence that the DRA led to an increase in
Medicaid exits among children and that this
increase may not be explained by seasonal differences in exit patterns. We next investigate
this more formally in a multivariate hazard
regression context.
B. The Impact of the DRA on Enrollment
Duration for Enrolled Children: Regression
Results
Table 2 provides estimation results for
Equation (1) using the 104,081 LIM children
Medicaid enrollment spells described in Table
1. The key coefficient of interest is on the highimpact first recertification indicator, because
these are the months in which the enhanced citizenship verification was first binding for children
starting coverage in the summer or fall of 2005.
The estimated hazard coefficient associated with
the high-impact first recertification indicator is
2.62 and highly statistically significant. This
suggests that children enrolled in a high-impact
first recertification month are 162% more likely
to exit relative to other months. When compared
to the average monthly exit probability in the
sample of 4.36%, this coefficient represents a
monthly exit probability of 11.41%. We call

Standard Error

p Value

Absolute Effect

0.026
0.007
0.008
0.005
0.007
0.007
0.008
0.002
0.000
0.029
0.012

0.00
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

11.41%
4.44%
4.06%
2.08%
3.38%
3.41%
3.91%
4.88%
4.35%
9.52%
5.36%

this the “absolute effect” associated with a
high-impact first recertification.
We can compare this exit rate to that of the
first (low-impact) rectification for children who
were enrolled just prior to the reform (starting
coverage in the winter or spring of 2005) and
as a result were not exposed to enhanced citizenship verification during their first recertification. The estimated hazard coefficient for a
low-impact first recertification is 2.18 and also
highly statistically significant. This implies that
the monthly exit rate associated with a lowimpact first recertification is 9.52%, which is
lower than the 11.41% monthly exit rate associated with a high-impact first recertification.
Table 2 also reports that the test statistic associated with a test of the equality of these two coefficients is 152.06, so the difference between the
high- and low-impact first recertification hazards
is highly statistically significant.
Both coefficients might seem like big differences relative to the baseline, but it is important
to remember that exit rates during recertification
months are always higher than during nonrecertification months. For this reason, we also include
controls for all other recertifications in the model
(estimated hazard coefficient 1.23, absolute effect
5.36%). Table 2 also suggests that male and nonwhite children are overall less likely to exit as are
children aged 12 and under, when compared to
children aged 13–18. The linear and quadratic
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TABLE 3
Duration Model for Georgia Medicaid Spells for Children: 2005 Main LIM Sample versus 2004
Placebo LIM Sample and 2005 Placebo SSI Sample (Initiated between December 2004 and
December 2005)
high_impact_first_recert
abs. effect
low_impact_first_recert
abs. effect
other_recerts
abs. effect
# spells
# exits
Log-likelihood
Average spell length
Average exit probability
Test statistic for test of equality of high-impact and
low-impact hazards
p value

2005 Main LIM

2004 Placebo LIM

2005 Placebo SSI

2.62***
11.41%
2.18***
9.52%
1.23***
5.36%
104,081
83,789
−130,719.02
18.46
4.36%
152.06

2.44***
9.55%
2.30***
9.00%
1.23***
4.83%
118,974
101,766
−157,130.06
21.83
3.92%
17.66

0.88
1.54%
1.05
1.84%
0.83***
1.46%
3,211
1,508
−3,380
26.83
1.75%
1.24

0.0000

0.000

0.2655

***Difference statistically significant at the 1% level.

time trend terms that model the baseline hazard
suggest that children are more likely to exit over
time.10
C. Placebo Tests
Figure 3B described above motivates our first
formal placebo test in which we replicate our
2005 LIM child hazard analysis on 2004 LIM
children. The 6-month exit patterns of children
newly enrolled in Medicaid via LIM in 2004
should not be influenced by the DRA. Table 3
restates our primary results based on our 2005
LIM sample in column 1 and states the results
of our 2004 LIM placebo hazard model in column 2. A comparison suggests a larger difference between the high- and low-impact groups
in our 2005 LIM sample than in our 2004 LIM
10. An alternative to including the recertification dummies would be to instead include a post-DRA-enhanced citizenship verification dummy on the right hand side of the
model. We expect that such an approach would be a noisy
indicator of the impact of the reform because it simply compares each child’s experience in the prereform period versus the postreform period. As discussed above, a child that
enrolls just prior to the reform, say December 2005, would
not have to provide enhanced citizenship on January 1, 2006.
Instead, this would be required at their 6-month recertification
in May 2006. If the child provides the proper documentation and meets any other eligibility requirements, then their
coverage will continue and additional citizenship documentation will not be required during future recertifications. If they
cannot, then they will be disenrolled. A simple postperiod
dummy would treat May 2006 the same as any other postreform month. Thus, this example suggests that a postperiod
dummy would not be the best way to isolate the impact of the
reform.

placebo sample, as expected. One interpretation
of the small, but statistically significant difference between the 2004 placebo high-impact hazard estimate and the 2004 placebo low-impact
hazard is that it represents an estimate of the
effect of seasonality on exit rates. We quantify
the size of the seasonality effect and compare it
to our estimate of the effect of the DRA in a set
of simulations described in the next subsection.
Our second placebo test takes advantage of
the fact that children enrolled in Medicaid via the
SSI program were already subject to enhanced
citizenship verification due to the federal nature
of the SSI program. The 6-month exit patterns of
children newly enrolled in Medicaid via SSI in
2005 should not be influenced by the DRA. The
third column of Table 3 reports the results of our
2005 SSI placebo hazard model. The high- and
low-impact first recertification hazard estimates,
as well as the difference between them, are not
statistically significant, which support the notion
that SSI children were not impacted by the DRA.
The fact that the results of both of these
placebo tests are as expected gives us confidence
that our main 2005 LIM sample is the appropriate
one to measure the impact of the DRA. Given
that SSI children are generally less likely to exit
Medicaid coverage, some may be concerned
about the suitability of SSI children as a control
group. One response would be that we are comparing the difference between 2005 SSI placebo
high- and low-impact children with the difference between 2005 LIM high- and low-impact
children rather than directly comparing LIM and
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SSI children. Another would be that it would
have been better for us from a research design
perspective if the DRA-enhanced citizenship
rules were applied randomly across the Medicaid
LIM population, but that was not the case. Thus,
we are using the best placebo/control groups we
have at our disposal.
D. Disenrollment Simulation
In order to compare the magnitude of the highimpact recertification coefficient with the lowimpact recertification coefficient in Table 2, we
simulated the number of monthly exits for an
initial cohort of 100,000 enrollees over the course
of 1 year under the assumptions that:
• their 6-month recertification exit rate is
given by either the high-impact (11.41%) or lowimpact (9.52%) absolute effect from Table 2,
depending on the group we are considering
• their 12-month recertification exit rate is
given by the “other” recertification absolute
effect from Table 2 of 5.36%
• all other months are assigned the baseline
exit rate of 4.36%.
Table 4A reports the results of this simulation
exercise, with the simulated results for the highimpact group in column 1 and the simulated
results for the low-impact group in column 2. By
design, both columns look the same for months
1–5 because both start with an equal number of
enrollees and apply the baseline exit rate in each
month. In month 6, we see a larger reduction in
enrollment for the high-impact group because we
applied the high-impact recertification absolute
effect estimate to that group.
After 12 months, 52,513 enrollees are estimated to remain in the high-impact group while
53,635 are estimated to remain in the low-impact
group, implying an additional 1,121 exits among
the high-impact group. If we apply the CMS
estimate of 0.10% of Medicaid enrollees being
noncitizens to our hypothetical cohort of 100,000
enrollees and assume all of the noncitizens lose
coverage, then this suggests that 100 of these
1,121 additional exits are generated by noncitizens and the remaining 1,021 are citizens. In
other words, for every 1 noncitizen that loses
Medicaid coverage, 10 citizens lose coverage.
Table 4B reports the results of a similar
simulation performed instead using the hazard estimates generated from our 2004 LIM
placebo group. While Table 4A predicts an
additional 1,121 exits among the high-impact

TABLE 4
Simulation Results: (A) 2005 Main LIM Sample
and (B) 2004 Placebo LIM Sample
A) 2005 Main LIM Sample

Start with:
End of month 1:
End of month 2:
End of month 3:
End of month 4:
End of month 5:
End of month 6:
End of month 7:
End of month 8:
End of month 9:
End of month 10:
End of month 11:
End of month 12:
Low–High
% noncitizen:
Estimated # noncitizens exiting:
Estimated # citizens exiting:

High-Impact
First Recert

Low-Impact
First Recert

100,000
95,429
91,067
86,905
82,932
79,142
70,114
66,909
63,851
60,932
58,147
55,489
52,513
1,121
0.10%
100
1,021

100,000
95,429
91,067
86,905
82,932
79,142
71,611
68,338
65,214
62,233
59,389
56,674
53,635
1.12%

High-Impact
First Recert

Low-Impact
First Recert

100,000
95,429
91,067
86,905
82,932
79,142
71,584
68,312
65,189
62,209
59,366
56,652
53,919
327
0.10%
100
227

100,000
95,429
91,067
86,905
82,932
79,142
72,018
68,726
65,585
62,587
59,726
56,996
54,246
0.33%

B) 2004 Placebo LIM Sample

Start with:
End of month 1:
End of month 2:
End of month 3:
End of month 4:
End of month 5:
End of month 6:
End of month 7:
End of month 8:
End of month 9:
End of month 10:
End of month 11:
End of month 12:
Low–High
% noncitizen:
Estimated # noncitizens exiting:
Estimated # citizens exiting:

group, Table 4B predicts only 327 additional
exits. As mentioned above, one interpretation of
these 327 additional exits is that they represent
seasonal differences in exit patterns, free from
any confounding effects of the DRA. We could
combine the results of both simulation exercises
to conclude that the DRA resulted in a net reduction of 794 (=1,121–327) additional enrollees
out of a hypothetical cohort of 100,000 enrollees
and, under the same assumptions as above, that
100 of these are noncitizens. This would suggest
that for every one noncitizen that loses Medicaid
coverage, eight citizens lose coverage.
E. Other Specification Checks
Our hazard model estimates reported in Table
2 are robust to several alternate specifications
involving our modeling of the unemployment rate
and the baseline hazard. Rather than modeling the
unemployment rate as a dummy equaling one in
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TABLE 5
Duration Model for Georgia LIM Medicaid Spells for Children: Different Approaches to Modeling
the Baseline Hazard (Initiated between December 2004 and December 2005)
Quadratic in Time

Weibull Baseline

Cox Model

2.62***
11.41%
2.18***
9.52%
1.23***
5.36%
104,081
83,789
−130,719.02
18.46
4.36%
152.06

2.76***
12.03%
2.43***
10.60%
1.30***
5.69%
104,081
83,789
−129,842.82
18.46
4.36%
12.18

2.63***
11.46%
1.92***
8.38%
1.99***
8.68%
104,081
83,789
−912,131.46
18.46
4.36%
447.09

0.0000

0.0005

0.0000

high_impact_first_recert
abs. effect
low_impact_first_recert
abs. effect
other_recerts
abs. effect
# spells
# exits
Log-likelihood
Average spell length
Average exit probability
Test statistic for test of equality of high-impact and
low-impact hazards
p value
***Difference statistically significant at the 1% level.

months with a higher than average rate, one of our
specification checks included the monthly unemployment rate itself. This did not lead to large
changes in our key parameters of interest. The
results of this specification check are available
upon request.
In terms of the baseline hazard, we estimated
two alternate specifications. First, we used the
Weibull distribution rather than our linear and
quadratic time trend terms. Second, we estimated
a Cox model, which is a popular empirical
specification for hazard models although it does
not provide a direct estimate of the baseline
hazard. As shown in Table 5, both the Weibull
and Cox models estimate a larger hazard on the
high-impact first recertification indicator than on
the low-impact first recertification indicator. In
both cases, the difference is statistically significant. Thus, our results are qualitatively similar
regardless of the way in which we model the
baseline hazard. In terms of magnitude, the Cox
model estimate suggests a bigger difference and
the Weibull model suggests a smaller difference
between high- and low-impact first recertifications than our primary results. We believe that
our approach is preferable to the Weibull model
because it allows for more flexibility. In addition,
we believe that our approach is preferable to the
Cox model, because the Cox model does not
provide a direct estimate of the baseline hazard.
VII.

DISCUSSION

Our results suggest that children facing a
high-impact first recertification were about 2
percentage points more likely to exit Medicaid

than those facing a low-impact first recertification. Such a large difference is not observed
if we compare Medicaid children whose first
recertification occurred in the summer or fall
of 2004 with those whose first recertification
occurred in the winter or spring of 2004. This
gives us confidence our results are not simply
reflecting seasonal differences in exit rates. In
addition, we do not observe an impact of the
DRA among children enrolled in Medicaid via
SSI, as those children were already subject to
enhanced citizenship verification.
Two additional pieces of evidence suggest
that the vast majority of this increase in Medicaid exits is generated by citizens. First, fewer
than 30 of the 104,081 spells in our 2005 LIM
sample are initiated by Hispanics, a group that
within which we would expect to see a larger
than average percentage of noncitizens.11 Second, prereform estimates by CMS itself suggest
that there were very few (roughly 0.10%) noncitizen Medicaid enrollees prior to DRA implementation (U.S. Government Accountability Office
2007). Taken together, our results suggest that
the DRA-enhanced citizenship verification rules
led to an increase in Medicaid disenrollment, and
thus a reduction in coverage, among citizens.
These findings lend support to the prereform
view of Medicaid directors that if all Medicaid
applicants were required to provide documentary evidence of U.S. citizenship, then this
would delay eligibility determinations, increase
11. This prevented us from doing any stratification by
Hispanic race/ethnicity.
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eligibility personnel costs, as well as be burdensome for applicants and current enrollees
(U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
2005). Our findings also lend more rigorous
support to the descriptive evidence provided
in the GAO post-DRA survey of states which
suggested that the DRA resulted in enrollment
declines for eligible citizens (U.S. Government
Accountability Office 2007). In addition, our
results are consistent with the descriptive finding
of Ross (2007) and Summer (2009) that while
the DRA is aimed at undocumented immigrants,
predominantly Hispanics, it was more likely
to negatively impact other population groups
who are citizens and are eligible for and/or
participating in public programs.
We view our findings on the impact of the
DRA on citizens as complementing the Sommers
(2010) finding that the DRA screened out one
in four adult noncitizens in Medicaid and one
in eight child noncitizens annually. Combining
the two sets of results suggests that while the
DRA screened out some noncitizens, this came
at the cost of increasing the exit rate of citizens.
These findings are consistent with the broader
literature on public program participation which
finds an inverse relationship between administrative burden (which is often increased in order
to screen out those noneligible) and program
take-up and retention rates among those eligible
to participate.
Our work is subject to a number of limitations. First, because the DRA requirements were
not randomized over Medicaid beneficiaries, we
are forced to rely on a quasiexperimental research
design. However, we find that our results are
robust to multiple placebo tests. Second, while
state administrative Medicaid data are required to
implement our research design, it does not allow
us to observe children when they are not enrolled.
Thus, inclusion in our sample is conditional on
Medicaid enrollment. In addition, the use of state
administrative Medicaid data limited our analysis to a single state. Finally, while the Medicaid
administrative data are extremely detailed, it does
not include a variable directly indicating citizenship status. Our results however are strongly suggestive that the additional Medicaid exits caused
by the DRA were generated by citizens.
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